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Abstract: In federal polities citizens have multiple public identities: they are addressed 
as members of the federal polity and as members of a sub-federal polity. Consequently, 
citizens are represented at the federal level through two channels of democratic 
representation: federal representation and sub-federal representation. Although this is a 
crucial element in the set-up of a federal system, the existing literature on 
representation hardly touches upon this and hence we introduce an approach to 
systematically compare these channels of representation. In this paper we 
conceptualize and operationalize the new concepts and apply our approach to 
democratic representation in 13 federal polities, including the EU, EU member states 
and non-EU member states. Our analysis shows that the EU has the highest degree of 
sub-federal representation (i.e. representation of the member states), but also shows 
that the EU stands not alone among federal polities. Belgium, Canada and Switzerland 
are clearly characterized by a high level of sub-federal representation as well, while 
countries such as the US and Australia are much more based upon federal 
representation. We also show that the variance between the countries can be 
understood by looking at the systemic features of the states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Robert Dahl (1994) was one of the first to discuss the transformation of democracy, noticing 
that the ancient Greek model of direct democracy in city-states gradually evolved into the 
representative form of democracy that is dominant today. Although representative 
democracy was already a first step for states to cope with a growingly complex environment, 
recent evolutions forced them to develop further (see for example Hurrelmann et al. 2005; 
Zolo 1992; Zürn & Leibfried 2005). On the one hand we observe a growing trend of 
decentralisation within states, while on the other we also see that states increasingly pool 
sovereignty at a higher level. Especially in federal polities these trends call for a 
reinterpretation of democratic institutions. In this contribution we introduce an alternative 
approach to study democratic legitimacy, applied to 13 federal polities, including the 
European Union (EU). More in particular, we present a perspective to study democratic 
representation in federal polities that incorporates multiple channels of representation. 
  
Part of the input-dimension of democratic legitimacy, representation is a crucial aspect in 
current-day democracies, especially since there is no real alternative at hand (Lefébure 
2009; Lord 2004). Most literature on democratic legitimacy of federal systems, including the 
EU literature, starts from traditional conceptualisations of legitimacy. For quite some time the 
concept of ‘democratic legitimacy’ has been closely associated with the distinction between 
input- and output-oriented legitimacy, famously put forward by Fritz Scharpf (1999). Input-
oriented legitimacy refers to the ability of citizens to provide input into the decision-making 
process, whereas output-oriented legitimacy deals with the compatibility between the 
outcome of the system and its acceptance by the citizens. This framework has been revised 
regularly. Vivien Schmidt (2010), for instance, opened it up to the systems theory of David 
Easton. Combining the work of Scharpf and Easton, Schmidt adds a third dimension to the 
debate: throughput legitimacy, which points to the process of decision-making and includes 
efficiency, accountability, transparency and openness to civil society. In recent years, many 
authors have discussed different issues of democratic legitimacy, often also related to the 
EU. Some focused on the difference between input and output legitimacy (e.g. Bellamy 2010; 
Lord 2004; Scharpf 1999); while others studied deliberation (e.g. Eriksen & Fossum 2011), 
identity and public sphere (e.g. Eriksen 2005), the contestation for political leadership (e.g. 
Follesdal & Hix 2006), accountability (e.g. Papadopoulos 2010), participation and 
representation (e.g. Kröger & Friedrich 2012; Marsh & Norris 1997; Monaghan 2012), issues 
of congruence between voters and representatives (e.g. Casado-Asensio & Lefkofridi 2011) 
or the role of nation-states in post-national democratic legitimacy (e.g. Glencross 2010). 
 
However, while acknowledging the evolving literature, it occurs to us that constituent units 
are not explicitly involved in these analyses, not even when discussing the democratic 
legitimacy of multilevel polities. We contend that one of the most defining characteristics of 
federal systems is precisely the existence of constituent units. Autonomous from but at the 
same time cooperating with the federal level of government, constituent units bring into 
practice the idea of ‘self-rule and shared-rule’ and are consequently vital in the democratic 
functioning of a federal system (Burgess 2006; King 1982; Watts 1999). In federal polities 
citizens have multiple public identities, which entails two channels of democratic 
representation: they can either be addressed as citizens of the federal polity or as citizens of 
sub-federal entities. ‘Sub-federal’ refers to all constituent units of a federal polity; it covers 
geographically demarcated regions, cultural groups as well as all other types of collectivities 
that play a role in constituting the federal system. Of course we say nothing new if we say 
that constituent units are represented at the federal level, but the main addition of this paper 
is that we systematically compare the degree of sub-federal representation in a broad range 
of federal systems. Starting from these federal and sub-federal channels of representation, 
this paper therefore aims to answer two questions. How can we re-conceptualise 
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representation, taking into account the somewhat neglected distinction between ‘sub-federal 
representation’ and ‘federal representation’? And how can we interpret the different 
proportion of both channels in a set of 13 federal polities? 
 
 
RECONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL POLITIES 
 
Democratic representation features prominently in debates on democratic legitimacy in which 
some authors discuss the legitimacy of collectively binding decisions (e.g. Scharpf 1999) and 
others the legitimacy of the political system as a whole (e.g. Schmidt 2010). We put 
ourselves in the slipstream of Schmidt (ibid. 2010, p.9), who argues that democratic 
legitimacy ‘relates to the extent to which institutional and interactive input politics, throughput 
processes and output policies are acceptable to and accepted by the citizenry, such that 
citizens believe that these are morally authoritative and they therefore voluntarily comply with 
government acts even when these go against their own interests and desires’. While studies 
of democratic legitimacy are valuable indeed, we take our magnifier and go one step further 
by focussing on democratic representation. In the typology presented by Schmidt (2010) 
representation is part of the input-dimension of democratic legitimacy. This dimension 
stipulates that polities are input legitimate once ‘they reflect the ‘will of the people’, that is, if 
they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of the community’ 
(Scharpf 1999, p.6). As Lord (2004) claims, this input dimension is the most crucial one in 
democracies. He argues that only democracies are ‘open to being justified in terms of a 
particular configuration of rights and obligations and of procedures that secure those rights’ 
(Lord 2004, p.13). Technocracies and authoritarian rulers may produce similar output as 
democracies, but this is not the case for input legitimacy. An additional motivation why we 
focus on input legitimacy is given by Majone (1998). He argues that input legitimacy is 
particularly relevant for redistributive policies, while it is somewhat less crucial for regulatory 
policies. Since we are especially interested in the democratic legitimacy of the political 
system as a whole, i.e. addressing both regulatory and redistributive policies, the input 
dimension gains relevance. Within this input-legitimacy a special place is reserved for 
representation. According to several authors there is no realistic alternative to democracy 
through representatives (Beichelt 2009). According to Eriksen and Fossum (2007, p.9) ‘no 
system can accommodate the participation of all relevant stakeholders’ which makes 
representation of particular importance. 
 
Citizens of federal polities incorporate multiple identities and are thus represented through 
the federal channel as well as through the sub-federal channel. Put otherwise, in federal 
systems individuals are addressed as both federal and sub-federal citizens. This observation 
partly mirrors the on-going debate regarding the EU’s democratic deficit. The EU is based on 
dual legitimacy, in which both citizens and states play a role (Eriksen & Fossum 2011; 
Fabbrini 2007). Some authors argue that the citizen-channel should be decisive in the 
democratic debate (i.e. Follesdal & Hix 2006), whereas others prefer a leading role for the 
states (i.e. Moravcsik 2002). The bottom line in this debate is that citizens are either 
addressed as European individuals or as members of the EU member-states. Extrapolating 
from the European case, we arrive at citizens of a federal polity and citizens of a sub-federal 
part of the polity. Federal representation then occurs if citizens as members of the federal 
polity are represented at the federal political level. Sub-federal representation, in its turn, is 
observed when citizens as members of the constituent units are represented at the federal 
political level. It is also important to add that there is a difference between sub-federal 
representation and indirect representation, although the two are closely related. In fact both 
federal and sub-federal representation can occur directly or indirectly. Sub-federal 
representation refers to the group that citizens are related to, whereas (in)direct 
representation points to the mechanism to obtain representation (the means to an end). 
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Finally, it is crucial to note that federal and sub-federal representation do not exclude one 
another: they coexist. In any given federal polity some institutional settings can be attributed 
to the federal channel and others to the sub-federal channel. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes this approach. The two arrows represent the channels of 
representation, which lead to the federal political level on top. Whereas federal 
representation is about being represented as citizen of the federal polity, sub-federal 
representation refers to being represented as citizen of the constituent units. 
 
 
Figure 1. Channels of representation in federal polities 
 
Federal Political Level 
⇅  ⇅ 
Citizens  Constituent 
units 
   
Federal 
Representation  
Sub-federal 
Representation 
 
 
 
But how do we perceive representation? In politics, the notion of representation refers to the 
ability of citizens to be represented in relevant decision-making bodies. The better citizens 
are represented at the decision-making table, the higher the level of input legitimacy of a 
political system (Burgess 2006; Bursens 2009). In current day politics, representation is very 
closely associated with the ‘responsible party government’ model. In this model several 
parties present themselves to the voters with policy promises and evaluations of the past 
performances. In order for this model to work effectively, parties ‘need to provide an 
alternative set of programmes on the major issues facing the country’, while ‘voters need to 
choose parties based on retrospective evaluations of their record in government, or 
prospective evaluations of their policy platforms’. Last but not least ‘free and fair elections 
need to be held at regular intervals to translate votes into parliamentary seats, and seats into 
government’ (Marsh & Norris 1997, 153-154). This traditional interpretation of representation 
links the preferences of the citizens to the achievements and performances of governments. 
One possible approach to analyse representation is to make the distinction between elective, 
semi-elective and non-elective forms (Saward 2010). We focus on elective forms, i.e. on 
political institutions, such as parliaments and political parties. Despite the correct observation 
of Bardi and colleagues (2010) that parties ‘have lost their capacity to act as representative 
agencies’, parties remain crucial in democratic representation and are therefore explicitly 
incorporated in our analysis. 
 
Concluding, we wish to stress that it is not our intent to evaluate democratic representation 
and subsequently argue why one form of representation is better than the other. Our goal is 
to sketch a picture of how representation in federal polities incorporates the twin notions of 
federal and sub-federal representation and to interpret the differences between federal 
polities. 
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MEASURING DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL POLITIES 
 
1. Operationalisation 
 
In federal or compound polities it is not so easy to organize representation in a 
straightforward way. Representation is much more complex in federal states than it is in 
unitary states: ‘compounded representation can therefore be defined as the interaction 
between principals and agents under conditions of shared rule, in which multiple agents 
compete for and share authority in overlapping jurisdictions and are accountable to multiple 
constituencies’ (Brzinski, Lancaster, & Tuschhoff 1999, 10; Tuschhoff 1999). This 
observation entails that we need to carefully operationalize the concept of federal and sub-
federal representation. How do we recognize federal and sub-federal representation when 
we see it? In this paragraph we present five empirical utterances of democratic 
representation that deal with the distinction between federal and sub-federal representation. 
Analysing federal representation in representative democracies obviously includes looking at 
how the parliamentary system functions. As this political institution is at the heart of 
representative democracy, numerous ways of legitimating the polity cross its paths. The first 
and foremost way to obtain federal representation is the existence of free and fair elections, 
which is of course also a precondition for any democratic society. Relevant here is that 
citizens of the federal polity can directly elect those who will represent them in the federal 
parliamentary assembly, particularly in upper chambers of federal polities. This is not always 
the case though: constituent units often only indirectly compose these upper chambers. 
Whereas direct elections for the federal level point towards more federal representation, 
indirect elections give more representational power to the sub-federal level – if those are 
indeed elected by the constituent units. 
 
A second indicator can be found in the role of political parties. Polity-wide parties function as 
intermediaries between the people and the federal level: the stronger these parties are – in 
comparison to non-polity-wide parties – the stronger the interests of the citizens are 
represented at the federal level. If non-polity-wide parties (or sub-federal parties) are 
dominant, however, this points towards sub-federal representation. Parties are still very 
much linked to representing the people and if they are focused on the level of the constituent 
units this has implications for (sub-) federal representation. Besides this, we also have to 
consider the existence of an electoral link between citizens and those who govern them at 
the federal level (so that the former can hold the latter electorally accountable). Members of 
the federal executive are often only elected by their own electoral constituency, since the 
borders of constituencies rarely cross borders of constituent units. But if the members of 
government are member of a party that all citizens in the different constituent units can vote 
for, some linkage remains. If this link is present, this points to federal representation. Its 
absence, in its turn, reflects sub-federal representation. 
 
The third indicator is the equality of reserved seats between constituent units in federal upper 
chambers. By allowing each constituent unit to have a fixed proportion of the seats, sub-
federal authorities can have a say in federal decision-making. This is very common in all 
federal polities, but one difference enables a different score: in some instances the number 
of seats is the same for every constituent unit, whereas in others the number of seats (partly) 
depends on the population of the constituent units – similar to elections of the lower 
chamber. If all constituent units are represented equally despite differences in size and 
population, this leads to a higher score for sub-federal representation since this means that 
the constituent unit people come from is more important than the people themselves. 
Although this may seem a small difference it unravels a broader underlying philosophy in the 
federal upper chamber: a chamber to represent citizens or a chamber to represent 
constituent units. 
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A fourth indicator is the position of the constituent units in the decision-making process. To 
what extent are the parliaments and governments of the constituent units involved in federal 
decision-making? Veto-power of the constituent units obviously leads to a higher degree of 
sub-federal representation if all constituent units can block legislation. The lack of vetoes or, 
more generally, low involvement of constituent units means the federal level has more 
autonomy and that the different representatives primarily represent all federal citizens. If this 
role is significant this leads to a higher score for sub-federal representation, whereas 
completely independent federal decision-making tends to lead to higher federal 
representation. 
 
The fifth indicator refers to the composition of the federal government. To what extent are 
federal entities represented? This can range from a federal government composed of 
representatives of the constituent units to a less institutionalised system with quota. If the 
presence of the different constituent units is ensured, this means that sub-federal 
representation is higher, since these executives to some extent represent the interests of 
their constituent units, while a lack of rules regarding the composition of the federal 
government refers to federal representation. Table 1 summarizes the operationalisation of 
both channels of democratic representation. 
 
Table 1. Operationalisation 
Federal representation Sub-federal representation 
Direct federal elections 
Dominant polity-wide parties 
No reserved seats in federal chamber 
Weak position of constituent units 
No guaranteed seat in federal 
government 
No direct federal elections 
Dominant non-polity-wide parties 
Reserved seats in federal chamber 
Strong position of constituent units 
Guaranteed seat in federal 
government 
 
2. Case selection 
 
This paper focuses on democratic representation as a major aspect of democratic legitimacy 
in federal political systems and thus the cases have to be both federal and democratic. The 
Forum of Federations (2013) lists 27 countries as being either federal or in transition towards 
federalism. Only democracies will be considered, though, and thus we narrow the list down 
with help of Freedom House (2012), which lists countries as free, partly free or not free, 
depending on a score for political rights and civil liberties. We have opted to include only free 
countries, since comparability is one of the fundamental requirements of comparative 
research. In this paper the focus is on representation, which is only ensured in free 
democracies. Without the subject of study it would be impossible to compare the different 
cases. For the very same purpose – comparability – we also excluded two other federal 
democracies: Saint Kitts & Nevis and Micronesia. Even though they may provide interesting 
insights, they are hardly comparable to our other federal polities given their small population 
(and matters related to this small population such as the lack of political parties). Especially if 
we wish to compare the EU to these systems, several problems pop up. By adding the 
European Union to the selected federal systems we end up with 13 cases of federal 
democracies: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, 
Germany, India, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. 
 
Why do we include the EU in this list? Hix (2005) convincingly argued why we ought to see 
the EU as a political system and even the idea that it is a federal political system is widely 
accepted in the literature. The main argument is that there is a significant difference between 
the concepts of federalism, federal political system and federation. Federalism refers to the 
broader principles, to an ideal. Federalism is a normative term, whereas ‘federal political 
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system’ is its structure, its real-world application. The third concept ‘federation’, then, is one 
possible utterance of this federal structure (King 1982; Watts 1998; Watts 1999). Other 
examples of federal structures are confederations, unions, leagues, quasi-federations or 
constitutional regionalisation (Burgess 2006; Elazar 1987). Our starting point is that the EU is 
a federal political system. We follow Watts, who sees a federal political system as a system 
characterized by ‘two (or more) levels of government thus combining elements of shared-rule 
through common institutions and regional self-rule for the governments of the constituent 
units’ (Watts 1999, p.7). In a federal polity distinct identities are accepted and even 
accommodated (Deschouwer, 2009; Watts, 1998, 1999). This certainly holds for the EU, 
having shared decision-making in the Council, the Commission, etc. and self-rule in the 
member states. 
 
ANALYZING DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL POLITIES 
 
3. Federal and sub-federal representation in 13 polities 
 
Based on country-specific and comparative literature (such as country profiles by the Forum 
of Federations) as well as constitutional documents, all polities were calibrated for each 
indicator with a value between 0 and 1 – the higher the number, the more sub-federal 
representation.1 For each indicator there are five categories: 0 refers to the absence of an 
indicator; 0,25 to a position in between leaning towards the absence of the indicator; 0,5 to a 
position in between; 0,75 to a position in between leaning towards the presence of the 
indicator; and 1 to the presence of the indicator. Let us consider first the indicator of direct 
federal elections. Each polity has at least one directly elected chamber (the lower house), so 
variance occurred through distinguishing between directly and indirectly elected second 
chambers (the upper house or senate). If its members were directly elected, these 
assemblies received a score of 0. Some of these second chambers are indirectly elected, 
however, resulting in a score of 1. In these latter cases the constituent units are responsible 
for deciding who is representing their interests in the second chamber. Four polities are 
situated in between these two extremes: Canada, India, South Africa and Switzerland. 
 
In Canada the senators are appointed by the Governor-General on advice of the Prime 
Minister, which is thus neither directly elected nor indirectly elected by the constituent units 
(resulting in a score of 0,5). In India the majority of parliamentarians is indirectly elected by 
states and territories, but some are appointed as well (score of 0,75). South Africa has a 
directly elected first and second chamber, but also an indirectly elected ‘Council of 
Traditional Leaders’ – which is appointed by the provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders 
(score of 0,5). The Swiss constitution, finally, depicts that cantons can decide for themselves 
how the representatives are selected. De facto, however, all cantons have direct elections 
and thus the score is inclining towards direct federal elections (score of 0,25). For the 
measurement of the second indicator on the dominant party level, the key was to look at the 
extent to which polity-wide parties are dominant in the political landscape. The highest score 
(1) was given to polities in which this is not the case (e.g. Belgium’s split party system), while 
the lowest score (0) was given to cases with exclusively polity-wide parties (Australia, 
Austria, Brazil, South Africa and the US). Lower intermediate scores (0,25) were attributed to 
cases with some exceptions (e.g. Basque or Catalan parties in Spain), while higher 
intermediate scores (0,75) were given to cases with significant exceptions (e.g. EU party 
federations). 
 
The third indicator – equal state representation in the federal chamber – was measured using 
constitutional documents and comparative studies. If all constituent units have the same 
number of seats, regardless of their population, the polity gets the highest score. This is the 
case in most polities (e.g. US Senate), but there are some exceptions, most notably in 
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Austria, Belgium, India and Spain. While there is no case of a purely population-based 
allocation of seats, these latter four cases do show that some polities incorporate a weighted 
form of representation for the federal second chamber. The fourth indicator looks into the 
presence of veto-rights of constituent units and is mostly based on Watts (2008). The 
presence of absolute vetoes for the constituent units yields the highest score (1), while the 
complete absence entail the lowest score (0). In between we find absolute vetoes on only a 
selected number of policy fields, suspensive vetoes, joint sittings, etc. More veto-rights 
enable higher scores for sub-federal representation. The fifth indicator – the composition of 
the federal government – again stems from constitutional documents, but takes into account 
informal arrangements as well. If all constituent units have a guaranteed place at the table, 
this leads to a high score of 1. Without such formal (e.g. Belgium, EU or Switzerland) or 
informal (e.g. Canada) arrangements the sub-federal representation is lower (0). This is for 
instance the case in the US, where the president nominates and the Senate approves 
ministers. Of course the constituent units indirectly have a say in this through the Senate, but 
this does not equal guaranteed presence in the cabinet. The scores for the individual 
indicators and the combined overall score are presented in table 2. 
 
This table shows very clearly that a majority of federal political systems (nine out of thirteen) 
obtain a score below 0,5 and are thus primarily based on the federal channel of democratic 
representation. These include obvious examples of monolingual, administrative federal 
polities such as Australia and the United States, but also less likely examples such as Spain. 
The latter has strong provinces in Catalonia and the Basque country, but yet has rather 
centralist tendencies in its institutional set-up. The cases scoring high on sub-federal 
representation are less surprising, however. The European Union, Belgium, Canada and 
Switzerland all have a multilingual and diverse society, which apparently translates into the 
set-up of channels of representation. 
 
Table 2. Scores sub-federal representation 
Political system Indicator Total score sub-federal representation 1 2 3 4 5 
European Union 1,00 0,75 0,75 0,75 1,00 0,85 
Belgium 1,00 1,00 0,25 0,25 1,00 0,70 
Canada 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,75 0,50 0,65 
Switzerland 0,25 0,25 0,75 1,00 1,00 0,65 
Germany 1,00 0,25 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,45 
Argentina 0,00 0,25 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,45 
Brazil 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,40 
India 0,75 0,75 0,25 0,25 0,00 0,40 
United States 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,40 
South Africa 0,50 0,00 1,00 0,25 0,00 0,35 
Spain 1,00 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,00 0,35 
Austria 1,00 0,00 0,25 0,25 0,00 0,30 
Australia 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,25 0,00 0,25 
Indicator 1: Indirect federal elections (0 = direct; 1 = indirect) 
Indicator 2: Dominant party level (0 = polity-wide parties; 1 = non-polity-wide 
parties) 
Indicator 3: Equal state representation in federal chamber (0 = no reserved 
seats; 1 = reserved seats) 
Indicator 4: Veto-rights of constituent units (0 = no vetoes; 1 = vetoes) 
Indicator 5: Ensured presence in the federal government (0 = no guaranteed 
seats; 1 = guaranteed seats) 
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4. Discussion 
 
A closer look at the table reveals that the EU obtains the highest score, which is perhaps not 
very surprising. It is the only polity that has a high score (0,75 or 1) in all categories: the 
second chamber – the Council of Ministers – is not directly elected; the party electoral link is 
weak since the party federations are still very much in development; all member-states have 
the same number of seats in the second chamber; the member-states have relatively high 
veto-power; and finally each member-state has a guaranteed position in the executive 
(Council or Commission). The combination of those characteristics makes the EU a chief 
example of sub-federal representation. 
 
Belgium is the second in the row, with a score of 0,70. Belgium’s lower scores are mostly 
related to the process of federal decision-making: the second chamber has varying 
representation specified for each unit and the constituent units have low veto-powers (which 
can perhaps be explained by the historically dual nature of Belgian federalism). There are 
remarkable features of sub-federal representation, though. The second chamber is indirectly 
elected; there are no nation-wide political parties; and both Flanders and Wallonia have 
guaranteed positions in the composition of the federal government. Overall representation in 
Belgium is thus more sub-federal than federal. 
 
Closely behind Belgium we find Canada and Switzerland, with a score of 0,65. Similar to the 
previous cases the majority of indicators incline towards sub-federal representation. If we first 
look at Canada, we see that the highest scores are observed in the allocation of reserved 
seats in the second chamber, with an equal representation for four regional groups of 
provinces. We also find an absolute veto (legally, albeit in practice not as strong) for the 
provinces and observe that the Governor-General appoints representatives in the second 
chamber. Currently the prime minister is responsible for the recommendations to the 
Governor-General, but some provinces have already installed electoral schemes to select 
senators. Although those bind neither the prime minister nor the Governor-General, this trend 
underlines an evolution towards the democratisation of the Canadian Senate. Other 
intermediate positions (neither clearly federal nor clearly sub-federal representation) are 
found in the dominant party system. While most parties are nation-wide, some significant 
ones are primarily focused on one province (e.g. Parti Québécois). Canada has the same 
parties at the provincial and federal level, though. Finally, the composition of government 
(informal agreement) yields similar, intermediate results. The Swiss, finally, have a positive 
score in all but one category. The second indicator (dominance of non-polity-wide parties) is 
relatively low, since the majority of parties are organised nation-wide – with only some 
parties exclusively active in a limited number of regions. An intermediate score of 0,25 is also 
found in the first indicator. While in theory all cantons can individually decide whether there 
are direct elections of the second chamber or not, in practice all have implemented direct 
elections. The remaining indicators are higher: full cantons all have the same number of 
representatives; the cantons have an absolute veto through the mediation committees; and 
all cantons have a guaranteed position in the executive. 
 
While the EU, Belgium, Canada and Switzerland have a dominance of the sub-federal 
channel of representation, the overall majority of cases has a score lower than 0,50 (which 
indicates that the federal channel of representation is dominant). Next in line are Argentina 
and Germany, who each have a score of 0,45. In the case of Argentina this is mainly so 
because of its equal state representation in the Senate and the absolute veto-power of the 
constituent units. In Germany it is due to a high score for the indirect elections of the 
Bundesrat and an intermediate score for equal state representation and veto-power. Not 
every Land is represented equally, but there are four categories of weighted state voting, 
thus partly depending on the number of inhabitants. The Länder are thus neither equal nor 
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completely unequal. Regarding the veto-power there is also an intermediate score: there is a 
suspensive veto on federal legislation that can be overridden by a corresponding Bundestag 
majority, but there is also an absolute veto on any federal legislation affecting state 
administrative functions (2008). In Argentina and Germany the proportion between federal 
and sub-federal representation is thus rather balanced. 
 
A slightly lower score is observed in Brazil, India and the United States (0,40). Brazil and the 
US in fact obtain the same scores on all indicators: strongly sub-federal regarding equal state 
representation and veto-power for the constituent units, but strongly federal regarding the 
other three indicators. India, on the other hand, has higher scores because of indirect federal 
elections (238 parliamentarians are indirectly elected by states and territories; 12 are 
appointed), but also because of the relative dominance of regional parties. Overall, one could 
say that these three polities lean towards federal representation, while also acknowledging 
their constituent units. 
 
South Africa and Spain follow this same trend, with a score of 0,35. The sub-federal 
characteristics of South Africa are situated in the equal state representation and – to a lesser 
extent – in the indirect elections of the Council of Traditional Leaders and some small veto 
rights through the combination of both a legislative and intergovernmental role of the upper 
chamber (Watts 2008). In Spain the situation is different, in that one indicator is clearly sub-
federal (being the indirect election of the Senate), while three are predominantly federal 
(party level, equal state representation and veto-rights) and one outspokenly federal 
(ensured presence in government). It is remarkable that the Spanish case has some 
tendency towards sub-federal representation in four out of five indicators, whilst also 
remaining predominantly characterised by federal representation in general. 
 
Austria and Australia are the final two polities. Austria has an indirectly elected federal 
chamber, but all other indicators point towards federal representation: dominant polity-wide 
parties, weighted state representation (although in multiple categories), only a suspensive 
veto for the constituent units (Watts 2008)) and no guaranteed seats in government. The final 
polity, Australia, has the lowest score (0,25). There are direct elections, the polity-wide 
parties dominate, there are limited vetoes and there are no guaranteed seats in the federal 
government. There is, however, equal state representation, but this is the only characteristic 
pointing towards sub-federal representation. Given the administrative nature of Australian 
federalism, this could hardly be called a big surprise. 
 
5. Explaining differences 
 
Why do some countries have higher scores than others? One way to look at this is to seek 
systematic patterns in the cases. There are of course several parameters to explain this. 
Here the focus is on more general characteristics of federal systems, namely the evolution of 
federalism (centripetal vs. centrifugal) and linguistic diversity (homogeneous vs. 
heterogeneous). In the following the paper has a brief look at those two characteristics. 
 
Direction of federalism 
 
While the twin notions of centrifugal and centripetal forces have become quite common in the 
literature on federalism, they are mentioned only scarcely in overviews of the literature. 
Burgess (2006) is one of the exceptions as he delves into the publications of Bryce, the first 
to introduce the concepts back in 1901. Put short, centripetal forces ‘drew men or groups of 
men together into one organised community while centrifugal pressures were those that 
impelled men to break away and disperse’ (Burgess 2006, 18). Swenden et al. (2006, 864) 
even call the question whether the ‘centrifugal and bipolar logic of Belgian federalism 
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triggered a dynamic that inevitably undermines the very survival of the Belgian state and 
nation’. More on this can be found in the literature on divided societies. Reilly (Reilly 2004, 7) 
sees centripetal polities as those with the focus of political competition directed at the centre 
– not at the extremes. Although his focus is mainly on conflicts and moderate decision-
making with all partners, the parallel to federalism can easily be made. In the case of 
federalism the centre refers to the federal level, while the extremes are the constituent units. 
Translated into the practical function of federal polities, this means that in centripetal polities 
the constituent units are coming together to form a stronger federal level. In centrifugal 
polities the constituent units gain more power and the federal polity is falling apart (or holding 
together, depending on the viewpoint). Polities, and especially federal polities, are often 
exposed to both opposing forces, but context determines which particular tendencies 
dominate. A fine example of these opposing forces can be seen in the European Union 
(Pinder 2010). Some argue for an increasingly federalised Europe, while others want the 
balance of power to be situated at the level of the member-states. The institutionalisation of 
the European project is clearly mirroring these two opposing trends.  Another utterance is 
found in the establishment of new states. According to Reilly (2004, 12) it is helpful to adopt 
institutions that constrain centrifugal forces, since they often affect newly created nations. 
The question how the direction of federalism affects federal and sub-federal representation 
can be answered by two possible explanations. On the one hand one could argue that in 
centrifugal federalism more power is flowing to the constituent units, thus enabling options for 
sub-federal representation. If the constituent units are gaining importance, one can expect 
that citizens of these constituent units are represented as such at the federal level. On the 
other hand one could also argue that the institutional set-up of a polity adapts more slowly 
than the trends in society. If constituent units are coming together, they will most likely retain 
some way of being represented at the federal level since they used to be more independent. 
Constituent units are the building blocks of federalising polities and thus they might want 
assurances for proper representation. 
 
There are thus two possible and conflicting arguments, but which one is more likely? Does 
the institutional set-up follow the direction of federalism or do the historical roots of the polity 
dominate? Additionally, it can also be argued that the direction of federalism changes in the 
course of history. Depending on the timing, the direction of federalism and the degree of sub-
federal representation might change. It is beyond the scope of this paper to take into account 
the timing issue, however. Further research will thus have to point out to what extent this 
condition is a factor, but the two options already show us the relevance of this condition: the 
direction of federalism can be linked to both channels of representation. 
 
A look at the data reveals that there are five cases with centrifugal federalism (being 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, India and Spain) and eight cases with centripetal federalism 
(Argentina, Australia, Austria, the EU, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland and the US). Of 
the four cases with a high score on sub-federal representation there are two centrifugal and 
two centripetal cases. Of the nine cases with a low score on sub-federal representation there 
are six centripetal and three centrifugal cases. There is certainly no obvious pattern in those 
results and the aforementioned argumentation may thus be plausible: the effect of the 
direction of federalism is not necessarily straightforward. 
 
Linguistic diversity 
 
Often trends and pressures in society lead to adaptations in the institutional architecture and 
diversity is one of the contributing factors. Two very concrete utterances of internal diversity 
are the presence of sub-state nationalism and linguistic diversity. 
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To begin with, Keating (2001) states that there are far more nations than there are states. 
According to Norman (2006, 96), ‘the basic challenge in the design of a multinational 
federation is to coordinate (a) the self-government aspirations of more than one national 
community, and (b) the rival nation-building projects by political actors in these communities, 
especially those in control of government institutions’. The constituent units often (but not 
always) coincide with those distinct national communities. In multinational federal polities the 
odds are that sub-federal representation will be a part of the overall setup of representation. 
The constituent units then represent different national communities and in order to assure the 
presence of all partners of the federal circumscription, the constituent units will most likely 
have practices accommodating their need for representation. One of the characteristics of 
nationalism is ‘a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize 
its national will’ (Norman 2006, 6). Without representation this will be hard. If we turn to 
mono-national or territorial federal polities, this same reasoning leads to a different outcome. 
The citizens of the federal polity form one demos or nation and thus the differences between 
constituent units are primarily of an administrative nature. Therefore there is no need to 
address citizens as members of both the federal polity and a constituent unit. It would thus 
make sense if these federal polities were primarily based on the logic of federal 
representation rather than sub-federal representation. 
 
Related to the issue of nationalism is linguistic diversity. Languages are often a distinct part 
of federal polities and thus it would be interesting to include this issue in our analysis, 
especially since language is often one of the reasons why federal polities became federal in 
the first place (cf. Mitra 2001). Of course this does not account for traditional monolingual 
federations like the Austria or Germany, but it is of significant importance in – for instance – 
Belgium or Switzerland. Multiple languages in one polity often trigger different public spheres 
as well. It was Habermas (1991) who first developed the concept and basically it refers to the 
quality of discourse and the quantity of participation within a democratic polity (Calhoun 
1992). Since ‘a public sphere is conceived as vehicle for marshalling public opinion as a 
political force’ (Fraser 2007, 45), it is often considered as an essential prerequisite for the 
democratic legitimacy of traditional nation-states (Sinardet 2011). An intriguing case is 
Switzerland (Dardanelli 2010). Cantonal identities are weakening, while more homogenous 
language communities are being formed. These are increasingly becoming the dominant 
spaces for public debate. Dardanelli (2010) even warns that domestic circumstances2 
support this trend and put pressure on the institutional architecture of Swiss federalism, 
perhaps even leading to greater politicisation of the language cleavage. 
 
With support from the literature on federalism, nationalism and public spheres, the claim can 
thus be made that internal diversity – consisting of sub-state nationalism and multilingual 
features – in a given federal polity will coincide with sub-federal representation. 
 
To determine whether a political system is diverse this paper uses two parameters: the 
number of dominant languages and the presence of regional nationalism. Thus there are four 
categories: polities with one dominant language without regional nationalism; polities with 
limited regional nationalism or a limited number of additional languages; polities leaning 
towards more regional nationalism and/or a number of additional languages; and finally 
polities with multiple languages and regional nationalism. The categorisation is based on 
country-specific literature, including country profiles of the Forum of Federations (cf. annex 
2). 
 
If we look at the data it occurs that 7 of the 13 cases are rather heterogeneous: Belgium, 
Canada, the EU, India, South Africa, Spain and Switzerland. If we compare this sample with 
the cases with a high score on sub-federal representation it shows that the four cases with 
high sub-federal representation are all diverse: Belgium, Canada, the EU and Switzerland all 
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have multiple languages and varying degrees of regional nationalism. Of the nine cases with 
lower sub-federal representation only three have high sub-federal representation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Representation is a crucial dimension of current day democracies and the way this is 
organised tells us a lot about the democratic legitimacy of any given polity. The aim of this 
contribution was to develop an alternative approach to study democratic representation in 
federal polities in a systematic way. In legitimating the federal level, citizens of federal polities 
are addressed as members of the federal polity and as members of one of the sub-federal 
polities. We introduced the study of the two related channels of representation, labelling them 
federal and sub-federal representation respectively. By operationalizing these concepts we 
showed how they could be measured, using five key indicators: direct or indirect federal 
elections (1), dominant (non-) polity-wide political parties (2), (no) reserved seats in the 
federal chamber (3), strong or weak vetoes in the decision-making process (4) and finally 
(no) guaranteed seats in the federal executive (5). The combination of those five features 
helps us understand to what extent citizens are represented at the federal level as either 
purely federal citizens or as citizens of both the federal polity and their respective constituent 
units. Subsequently our analysis showed that the argument is empirically viable. That sub-
federal representation is strongly institutionalised in the EU is perhaps not very surprising, 
but our analysis also showed that this approach holds for other federal polities. Belgium, 
Canada and Switzerland all obtain scores inclining towards sub-federal representation. This 
means that in these polities citizens are also considered to be multi-dimensional: they are 
citizens of the federal polity, but also citizens of their respective constituent units. Thus the 
citizens are represented in multiple ways, mirroring the broader institutional set-up of federal 
political systems, which consists of (at least) two levels of government. 
 
A look at the societal basis of these polities is meaningful as well. While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to systematically analyse differences between cases of federal and sub-
federal representation, a brief glance shows that all cases with a high score are 
characterised by a diverse society. All of them have multiple languages and some also 
encounter nationalist tendencies within their polity. Intuitively it therefore feels right to 
observe these cases at the top of our list. Misfits in this regard are India and Spain. At first 
glance Spain is expected to have a high score, given its multiple languages, quests for 
autonomy of the states and its centrifugal federalism. On the other hand, it is equally true that 
the Spanish case has long been characterised by contrasting views on what the ‘nation’ and 
the ‘states’ are (Keating & Wilson 2009). Despite this, however, it also noted that Spain only 
got the lowest score on one indicator, while all others indicators at least show some 
inclination towards sub-federal representation. A look at the direction of federalism showed a 
less clear picture. Whether a federal system is centrifugal or centripetal does not seem to 
have a relationship with the degree of sub-federal representation. 
 
Concluding, our analysis shows that the distinction between federal and sub-federal 
representation is empirically viable. The discussion has shown that we can interpret the 
outcome by going back to key characteristics of the federal systems themselves. Clearly, this 
raises new questions that need to be addressed in future work: we need to formulate 
hypotheses pointing to the features of the federal polities which can explain the balance 
between federal and sub-federal representation and to the mechanism at play. These 
questions remain to be resolved. So far, this contribution has shown the relevance of the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of double channel of representation for the empirical 
analysis of federal polities, highlighting and interpreting the similarities and differences 
among them. 
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ANNEX 
6. Annex 1: Indicators sub-federal representation 
Federal polity Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 
Argentina Directly elected Dominant state-wide parties, 
but important role for 
provincial party leadership 
Equal state representation Limited role and no real 
veto 
No 
Australia Directly elected Dominant state-wide parties Equal state representation Limited role, deadlock 
resolved by double 
dissolution and then joint 
sitting 
No 
Austria Indirectly elected by 
state parliaments 
Dominant state-wide parties Weighted state 
representation: multiple 
categories 
Limited: more 
administrative federalism, 
but suspensive veto 
No 
Belgium Indirectly by state 
parliaments 
Only non-polity-wide parties Majority of regional 
representatives, weighted 
Limited role, but equal 
powers for both chambers 
Yes, language 
groups equally 
represented 
Brazil Directly elected Dominant state-wide parties Equal state representation Limited, more about 
improving democracy than 
about power. No real veto. 
No 
Canada Appointed by 
Governor-General on 
advice of Prime 
Minister 
Combination of federal and 
provincial parties that are 
loosely connected 
Equal ‘regional’ 
representation 
Weakly institutionalised, 
but executive federalism. 
Absolute veto only legally, 
but not in practice. 
Yes, albeit 
informally 
EU Indirectly elected by 
member-states 
Party federations not yet fully 
developed 
Equal state representation 
in Council and CoM 
Big role in Council, weaker 
role of national 
parliaments. Mostly QMV, 
but seek consensus. 
Yes 
Germany Indirectly elected by 
state parliaments 
Dominant state-wide parties 
(exception of CSU) 
Weighted state voting: 
four categories 
Increasing role for 
Bundesrat, but Länder 
more administrative. 
Absolute or suspensive 
veto, mediation 
committees. 
No 
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India Indirectly elected by 
states and territories 
(238), appointed (12) 
Dominance of regional 
parties, but also some 
federal 
Weighted state 
representation: multiple 
categories 
Increasing role, but still 
limited. Deadlock resolved 
by joint sitting, brief 
suspensive veto for 
money bills. 
No 
South Africa Both chambers 
directly elected, but 
Council of Traditional 
Leaders is appointed 
Dominant state-wide parties Equal state representation Both legislative and 
intergovernmental role for 
upper chamber. No real 
veto. 
No 
Spain Indirectly elected by 
provinces, 
assemblies of 
Autonomous 
Communities/Regions 
Dominant state-wide parties, 
but some strong regional 
parties as well 
Minority of regional 
representatives 
Limited role, but 
suspensive veto: time limit 
of two months. 
No 
Switzerland Depends on Cantons Dominant state-wide parties, 
but also some regional ones 
Two categories of 
cantonal representation 
Sometimes crucial, 
sometimes only 
administrative. Absolute 
veto with mediation 
committees. 
Language and 
geographical 
must be 
represented 
United States Directly elected Dominant state-wide parties Equal state representation Limited: coercive 
federalism, but absolute 
veto with mediation 
committees. 
No 
Indicator 1: No direct elections of the federal upper chamber 
Indicator 2: Dominance of non-polity-wide political parties 
Indicator 3: Reserved seats in federal upper chamber 
Indicator 4: Involvement of constituent units in federal decision-making 
Indicator 5: Guaranteed position of constituent units in the composition of the executive 
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7. Annex 2: Sources data-collection 
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[5]  Ballendorf, Dirk Anthony. 2005. “The Federated States of Micronesia.” In 
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1
 A list of sources and motivation for scores is presented in the annex. 
2
 He is referring to the on-going concentration in printed media, making it harder for 
newspapers with a strong cantonal identity to stay put. A second trend is the growing 
role for television and other media, which are mainly organised on a linguistic basis. 
